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EDITORIAL NOTES
lad not personally observed the details of the trial procedure.
.The Supreme Court held that the special judge had no discretion
whatever in passing upon the assignments of error, explaining
that whatever discretion reposes in a trial court upon such a mo-
tion is based solely upon the assumption that personal observation
of trial details has created a peculiar competency in the trial
court to pass upon questions of error. The court says:
"Under our decisions, such discretionary power of a judge
presiding at a trial is very limited. In such cases he has none
at all, unless there is legal ground for a new trial . . ... .
Observations respecting such discretion, found in the books,
probably mean no more than that the judge's decision as to
the sufficiency of a ground urged for a new trial, when there
is a condition calling for judgment as to the existence thereof,
will not be disturbed by the appellate court. If an apparent
and prejudicial error was committed in the course of the
trial, there is no discretion in the court to refuse a new trial.
If, on the other hand, there is not so much as a shadow of
error in the proceedings, there is no discretion to grant one."
The principles announced in this case, apparently sound, place
very broad limitations upon the unqualified general discretion an-
nounced in the earlier decisions. Since the court may exercise a
discretion only where personal observation of trial matters will
aid that discretion, it necessarily follows that pure errors of
law which are prejudicial ordinarily can not be mitigated by any
discretionary view that the trial court may take of them. It is
believed that the recent case merely states in definite formula a
rule which has long been tacitly assumed and applied by the court.
-L. C.
EFFECT OF MERE PROTESTS BY SERVIENT OWNER ON ADVERSE
UER.-In order to permit the acquisition of easements by long con-
tinued user the English courts (probably after the passage of the
statute of 21 Jac. I. c. 16) resorted to the fiction of a lost grant
instead of solving the problem directly by applying the Statute of
Limitations by analogy as had probably been done under prior
statutes. This has become the law quite generally. In many jur-
isdictions the result of the adoption of this fiction has been to ac-
complish substantially the effect of applying the Statute of Lim-
itations by analogy. This is certainly true in those jurisdictions
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where it is held that proof of continuous adverse user for the pe-
riod required to acquire title by adverse possession raises a con-
elusive presumption of a lost grant of the easement in question.
It would have been better had the fiction been repudiated and the
Statute of Limitations applied by analogy but as was stated by
Thesiger, L. J., in Angus v. Dalton:
"Whatever strictures may have been made upon this method
of judicial legislation, the fiction has been promotive of ben-
eficial results, and forms the basis of prescriptive titles, and
it is now too late to question the validity of its introduction.
The doctrine of a lost grant forms a part of the law of the
land, and any dislike which may be felt for this and like fic-
tions cannot be allowed to interfere with the carrying out of
the doctrines involved in them to the full extent, which has
been sanctioned by established authority."'
A considerable number of decisions go at least so far as to hold
that adverse user continued throughout the requisite period will
give rise to the presumption of the fictional grant, provided that
at the time the user began the landowner was capable of making a
grant, and assuming, of course, such user was sufficiently open and
notorious. 2  This constitutes a fairly clear rule of law (though it
does involve a fiction) where the presumption is held conclusive,
and perhaps also where it is held rebuttable by certain limited
classes of evidence only. Unfortunately there is a respectable body
of authority which has adopted the theory that the presumption of
a lost grant in any case is one which may be rebutted by any evi-
dence tending to show that no grant was in fact made, and whether
it is rebutted is left to the jury to decide.3 Under these authorities
various kinds of evidence have been held admissible as tending
to rebut the presumption. It would seem that the field is left
entirely open for the introduction of any sort of evidence which
the court might conclude had such a tendency. A somewhat typ-
ical statement of the essential elements of adverse user-a sort of
% 4 Q. B. D. 160, 171 (1878). See also Lehigh Valley RR. Co. v. McFarlan, 43
N. J. L. 604, 617 (1881).
2 Lehigh Valley RR. Co. v. McFarlan, supra; Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Dia-
mond Mills Paper Co., 71 N. J. Eq. 481, 64 Atl. 746 (1906), affirmed 73 N. J. Eq.
414, 75 Ati. 1101 (1907); Okeson v. Patterson, 29 Pa. St. 22 (1857); Jordan ,.
Lang,22 S. C. 159 (1884) ; Ferrell v. Ferrell, 60 Tenn. 329 (1872) ; Kimball 'V.
Ladd, 42 Vt. 747 (1870).
3 Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. v. Hoag, 90 Ill. 339 (1878); Powell V. Bagg,74 Mass. 441 (1857) ; Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 98 Atl. 743 (1916) ; Nichols
v. Aylor, 7 Leigh 546 (Va. 1836) ; Field v. Brown, 24 Gratt. 74 (Va. 1873) ; Reid v.
Garnett, 101 Va. 47, 43 S. E. 182 (1903). See Wooldridge v. Coughlin, 46 W. Va.
345, 33 S. D. 233 (1899) ; Eels v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 49 W. Va. 65, 38 S. U.
479 (1901).
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rule as to the minimum evidence which will justify the presump-
tion of a lost grant is as follows:
"In order to establish a private right of way by prescrip-
tion over the lands of another, the use and enjoyment thereot
by the claimant must be shown to be adverse, under claim ot
right, exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, and with the,
knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the land over
which it is claimed." 4
Probably most of these elements would be regarded as more
or less essential to show adverse user in jurisdictions which have
adopted the conclusive presumption theory. Most of them appeat
to have been borrowed from the rules of law as to adverse pos-
session of land. There is, however, one notable exception, namely,
acquiescence of the owner of the land in the user. According to
the usual meaning of these words, they would seem to be incon-
sistent with the requisite that the user must be adverse or hostile to
such owner. Evidently the word acquiesce must have a limited
meaning when used in this connection.
What does the term acquiesce mean? The courts which hold
that the presumption of a lost grant is rebuttable say it means
merely absence of dissent.' The idea apparently is that a lost
grant cannot be priesumed unless during the time of the user the
parties' acts are consistent with a grant which both respect. Hence
it is said that evidence of dissent on the part of the landowner
tends to rebut the presumption of a lost grant, and sometimes we
find expressions to the effect that one cannot acquire a right by pre-
scription if the landowner protests against the use.6 It is submit-
ted that such protests ought to be considered immaterial. Certainly
protests by a grantee of the one who owned the land when the user
began do not tend to indicate there was no grant; and when made
by one who has owned the land throughout the user they can
hardly be said to have more than a slight tendency. Furthermore,
the one using the right might deny that protests were in fact made,
but he would be unable to produce evidence to overcome the effect
of the protests when they are once proved. That is, he cannot
make out a case in spite of the protests. The reason is that we are
dealing with proof of a fiction instead of a fact. The object of the
invention of this fiction was to permit the acquisition of an ease-
4 Reid v. Garnett, supra, 48, 182.
r Note 3, supra.
6 Wooldridge v. Cougblin, supra, 348, 235.
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ment by long continued user. Apparently these courts concern
themselves too greatly with the evidence which tends to prove a
pure fictional thing and too little with the purpose of the invention
of the fiction. A certain sort of user might be held to establish
the fictional grant but confusion results from treating this fiction
as if it were a fact to be established by evidence like other facts.
The doctrine that the presumption of a lost grant may be rebut
ted by any sort of evidence which tends to show there was no
grant, seems to have had its origin in the cases of Nictols v. Ayler 7
and Powell v. Bagg.8  The former was decided over twenty years
before the latter, but is not cited in the latter. Both cases hold
that actual interruption of the user is not essential, but that evi-
dence of verbal protests is admissible because such evidence rebuts
the presumption of a lost grant by showing the landowner did
not acquiesce in the user. A number of authorities are cited in
each case, and while in some of these authorities statements to the
effect that the user must be with the acquiescence of the owner may
be found, none of them define the word when used in this connee
tion or even give any indication as to its meaning. That this was
not the sense in which the expression was used in the English
authorities on prescriptive rights is indicated by the great case of
Angus v. Dalton. In that case as many as seven of the eighteen
judges who handed down opinions concluded that such evidence
was immaterial, 9 while the other judges, with one possible excep-
tion,'0 expressed no opinion on the point. There seems to be very
little in the English decisions to justify the admission of such evi-
7 Leigh 546 (Va. 1836).
8 74 Mass. 441 (1857).
. "I conclude, therefore, that the mere absence of assent, or even the express dis-
sent of the adjoining owner, would not prevent the right to light and support from
being acquired by uninterrupted enjoyment, . . ." 3 Q. B. D. 93, per Lush, J.
"neither is it sufficient to prove such circumstances as negative an actual as-
,ent on the part of the servient owner to the enjoyment of the easement claimed, or
even evidence of dissent short of actual interruption or obstruction to the enjoyment."
4 Q. B. D. 172, per Thesiger, L. J.
"in such case mere dissent by the owner of the alleged servient tenement will
not be sufficient to rebut the presumption." 4 Q. B. D. 186,per Cotton, L. J.
"Whether he has assented or not, even if he has dissented, appears to me im-
material, unless he has disturbed the continued enjoyment necessary to the acquisi-
tion of the right." 6 App. Cas. 766, per Lindley, J. Lopes, J., fully agreed with
Lindley, J. See 6 App. Cas. 767.
In 6 App. Cas. 771, Manisty, J., after holding the presumption was one of law,
said: "If the presumption be one of law, it follows that neither positive acquiescence,
nor a grant of support as a matter of fact, by the owner of the neighboring soil is
requisite for the acquisition of the right in question."
Fry, J., in the case of a right of way was of the opinion that acquiescence In-
volved the power to prevent the act either by an act on his part or by action in the
courts and the abstinence by him from such interference for the requisite period.
See 6 App. Cas. 774.
'0 See opinion of Bowen. J., 6 App. Cas. 779.
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dence, particularly where the owner has power to interrupt the
user both by physical acts and by suit at law.
The great difficulty in considering this question is the fact that
the lost grant is a fiction. It would be just and proper to consider
the protests of the alleged grantor if the lost grant were being
proved as a reality, but it seems somewhat absurd to try to deter-
mine whether or not certain evidence tends to prove a fictional
grant. If the purpose of resorting to the fiction was to establish
a method by which prescriptive rights may be acquired by long
continued user, it would seem far better to have a fixed arbitrary
rule of law as to what is essential to create such right than to sub-
mit a lot of miscellaneous evidence to the jury under directions
which authorize them to find a lost grant where everyone concerned
knows none in fact existed. The difficulties of the English courts
have been chiefly due to the so-called negative easements such as
the right of support of buildings and the easements of light and air.
The reason for their embarrassment in these cases is the servient
owner's inability to interrupt the user either by physical acts or
action by law. In this country such easements cannot be acquired
by adverse user.11 In the case of user which involves actual
trespass the landowner can lawfully obstruct the user at any time.
He is in a more advantageous position even than is one who is
ousted from possession of land, for the latter can seldom regain
possession without resorting to an action at law. Hence in this
country the landowner can always bring an action at law and in
most cases he can obstruct the use in such a way as to cause inter-
ruption. While verbal protests by the landowner may tend to
show a weak objection to the user, yet, on the other hand, if the
user is continued in spite of such protests it shows a strong claim
of. right which should more than counteract the effect of the pro-
tests. As was well stated by the Supreme Court of Tennessee:
"The mere fact of making an objection, would not inter-
rupt the adverse character of the user by the party claiming
it; on the contrary the principles we have cited, showing that
the holding must be adverse to the owner of the land, would
favor the view, that if there had been a holding notwithstand
ing the objection made, that it would thereby be shown more
distinctly to be adverse, than if no such objection had been
made. It would certainly serve to show satisfactorily that
2 TnPANY, REAL PROPERTy, 2 ed., 2039-40.
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the right had been asserted and enjoyed, with the knowledge
of the owner of the land, and as such, adverse to any claim
he had to prevent it. '12
The same argument was made in the leading New Jersey case:
"Protests and remonstrances by the owner of the servient
tenement against the use of the easement, rather add to the
strength of the claim of a prescriptive right; for a holding in
defiance of such expostulations is demonstrative proof that
the enjoyment is under a claim of right, hostile and adverse;
and if they be not accompanied by acts amounting to a dis-
turbance of the right in a legal sense, they are no interruption
or obstruction of the enjoyment."13
Clearly in cases where there is no actual dissent by the land-
owner the recognition and assent to the user is only apparent and
resulting litigation usually shows there never was any real assent.
Where the claimant persists in the user in spite of objections of
the servient owner the claim of adverse right is vigorously asserted.
This claimant insists on the right and acts accordingly. Why
should mere protests without other action have such great weight?
In most cases the landowner can stop the user without even bring-
ing a suit by merely obstructing the user.
In a recent case in West Virginia4 the servient owner had put
up gates across the way and kept them locked for about a year,
but it appeared that persons accustomed to use the way, includ-
ing the owner of a part of the claimant's land, broke the locks and
passed through whenever they desired so there was no actual in-
terruption of the user. The court held that the prescriptive right
had been acquired. This seems inconsistent with the doctrine that
mere protests are enough to prevent the presumption of a lost
grant, for obstruction of the way by means of locked gates certain-
ly ought to be more effective than mere protests against the user
even though no actual interruption of the user resulted. It
is submitted that under the doctrine under discussion this consti-
tuted strong proof of lack of acquiescence for the period of a year
and consequently no presumption of a lost grant should arise un-
til after ten years user subsequent thereto. On principle, in so
far as the decision indicates a tendency on the part of the court
12 Ferrell v. Ferrell, supra, 336.
,s Lehigh Valley RR. Co. v. McFarlan, supra, 630.
" Staggers v. Hines. 104 S. E. 768 (W. Va. 1920).
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to limit or overrule the doctrine that mere protests against the
user are sufficient to prevent the acquisition of prescriptive ease-
ment, the decision is to be commended. However, the result
reached would probably have been quite justified under the evi-
dence had the point above discussed been disregarded, because the
prescriptive right was probably complete before the gates were
erected across the way. -J. W. S.
DUTY OF AN INFANT To RETURN CONSDERATION AS A PRE-
REQUISITE TO DISAFFIRMANE.-The natural incapacity and improv-
idence of an infant, due to his immature years, has caused the law
to hedge him around with certain legal protections. Among the
chief of these is the power to disaffirm his contracts. That the use
of this extraordinary power, under any circumstances, contains
the possibility of great hardship upon the adult who has ventured
to contract with the infant is obvious. The law, therefore, should
allow its exercise only to the minimum extent necessary to carry
out the purpose of the law in granting it to him. In other words,
the law should be careful to see that the adult who has contracted
with him suffers no more harm than is requisite to protect the in-
fant from indiscretions due to his unripe judgment. Approach-
ing the question from this viewpoint the inquiry becomes this:
In what eases is it essential to the protection of an infant that
he be allowed to avoid his contract without, as a condition prece-
dent, returning the consideration?
In discussing this point it has been common to draw a distinc-
tion between contracts wholly executed and those executed only on
the part of the adult.' In the latter ease it is said that return of
the consideration is not a prerequisite to- disaffirmance; in the for-
mer it may be. There seems to be no sound reason for such a dis-
tinction.2 There is just as much hardship on the infant where he
is prevented from getting back what he has given unless he dis-
gorges what he has received as where he is compelled to hand over
the same thing if he does not disgorge. The fact that he is not the
acting party seems immaterial.
Assuming, then, that there is no difference between wholly ex-
I See Eureka v. Edwards, 71 Ala. 248, 249 (1881) ; lfustard v. Wohlford, 15 Gratt.
329, 343 (Va. 1859) ; Bedinger v. Wharton, 27 Gratt. 857, 871 (Va. 1876). See also
PEciC, DOmESTIC R LATIoNs, 224. These cases do not apply the distinction where the
Infant no longer has the consideration.
2 See Gillespie v. Bailey, 12 W. Va. 70, 92 (1877).
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